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DOES SPORTS PERFORMANCE INFLUENCE REVENUES AND  
ECONOMIC RESULTS IN SPANISH FOOTBALL? 
 
ABSTRACT 
English football began taking steps towards becoming a business earlier than 
Spanish football did, and academic studies on the football industry to date also 
focus primarily on football in the UK. The evidence for the relationship between 
sports performance and revenues appear clear in English football. There is 
even research about the effects of a club’s wealth on its sports performance, or 
the effects of a club’s sporting situations on its finances. In this paper, we ana-
lyse the relationship between sports performance and the revenues of football 
clubs as well as the effect of sports performance on the financial results in 
Spanish professional football. In order to carry out this research we have had to 
select which variables to analyse and choose the most appropriate methods of 
measurement. We have designed a system which obtains a variable of sports 
performance that includes information from every competition in which the foot-
ball club participates.  
 
Key Words: sports performance, economic results, football (soccer), football 
club finances. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Most studies about professional sport in the United States consider that clubs 
are profit maximisers. Sloan (1971) broke with this tradition pointing out that, at 
least for English football, profit-making clubs were not the norm. However, the 
incorporation for English football clubs to the financial markets might have 
changed this tendency for some clubs. In this context we were interested in the 
relationship between performance on the pitch and revenues in Spanish foot-
ball, and whether or not the economic results of a club can be explained by its 
sports performance. Before outlining the results of the research, it is worth re-
viewing some of the most relevant studies on this topic.    
The profit and loss account reflects the capacity that a company has to obtain 
(or not) a surplus from its turnover once all its expenses are deducted. For this 
reason, as far as economic results are concerned, it is worth observing the ef-
fect of sports performance on revenues, and the relationship of these revenues 
with costs Although both turnover and expenses really depend on managerial 
skills, the expenses are more easily controlled than turnover because income 
relates to consumer demand. Control of expenses would lead to profits. If there 
is no policy for expenses to achieve a margin, there is little chance of profitabil-
ity. 
Most research into economic and financial features of football analyse the rela-
tionship between sports performance and income, expecting them to be posi-
tive. Szymanski and Kuypers (1999) state that the proportion of the change in 
income during the 1996/97 season is explained by 82% (R2=0.82) by the Eng-
lish league position in that season. The result raises to an R2 of 0.89 when they 
work with a longer period (1978-97). They use the logarithm of the revenues of 
each club divided by the yearly mean of the revenues of the all clubs as a 
whole. They conclude that winning teams, in the long term, are likely to attract 
high incomes. 
Deloitte and Touche (1999; 2000 b) carry out analogous studies adjusting, by 
means of a non-linear regression, the total incomes of Spanish football clubs in 
the First Division with their ranking at the end of the league championships in 
seasons 1996/97, 97/98 and 98/99. 
Clubs, in general, need funds to cover their expenses. These funds may come 
from operations but if the turnover is not high enough then most of the clubs will 
have to go into debt. In this sense, it can be stated that the greater the club‘s 
wealth, the higher its ability to spend money is and, as a consequence, the 
probability of it performing better on the pitch is also higher. 
In this way, Murphy (1999 a and b) looks for the relationships between sporting 
performance and the rising wealth in English and Scottish football. He starts 
from the widespread idea that concentration of economic resources is inevitably 
reflected on the pitch and therefore in the performance rankings. He tries to test 
this hypothesis and whether or not a gap has appeared between the richest and 
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the poorest clubs in the English and Scottish leagues. In the English case, his 
data do not deny a growing correlation between financial resources and sport-
ing performance – measured by final league positions However, there are no 
clear indications that the accumulation of financial resources has broadened the 
gap between clubs. According to Murphy, there is a strong likelihood that some 
clubs from the Premier League will maintain their status whereas the position of 
others will weaken. As a consequence, these weaker clubs will be more likely to 
be relegated. Therefore the number of ‘yo-yo’ clubs1 increases. In the Scottish 
case, he observes that the gap – measured by points and goals – between the 
richest and the worst-off in the Scottish Premier League is narrowing. At the 
same time, the probability of one of the main clubs – Glasgow Celtic or Glasgow 
Rangers – winning the league is increasing. To summarise, he concludes that in 
the Scottish Premier League the relationship between economic results and 
sports performance is less direct and more complex than we might expect. 
The Deloitte and Touche Annual Report (2000 a) also analyses the effects of 
relegation. Initially, it refers to the levels of attendance and states, although 
without a solid base, that in the season which follows relegation fans continue to 
attend matches through force of habit. However, it claims that other revenues, 
such as commercial or sponsorship, will be affected more dramatically. 
The point of view offered by Noll (2002) in his study is slightly different, mainly 
because he approaches the issue from another perspective. Making use of 
English football data, he reaches the conclusion that players’ wages of teams 
involved in promotion or relegation are higher than expected. At the same time, 
promotion and relegation have a positive effect on attendance and, finally, he 
thus maintains that the effects of promotion and relegation are ambiguous. 
Developing this, Gerrard (2002) explores further the impact that relegation trig-
gers on a club’s finances. He returns to the initial proposition in that sports per-
formance influences turnover and not the contrary, as Murphy maintained. After 
analysing the clubs relegated from the (English) Premier League in1999 and 
2000, he concludes that relegation has a double effect from a financial point of 
view. On one hand, relegated clubs have the advantage of enjoying greater in-
comes than the rest of clubs in their division.2 On the other hand, they have to 
face up to inflexible wage costs and run the increased financial risk if the clubs 
continue with high expenses in wages in order to try and win a quick promotion 
back to the Premiership. He also perceives a rise in relegation costs for ‘yo-yo’ 
teams and notes that hardly any club in this situation reduces its salaries. 
Noll’s first two conclusions concur with the aforementioned analysis of Gerrard 
(2002). He claims that one of the advantages of the European system of open 
leagues lies in the relevance that matches assume as a consequence of the 
fear of relegation and, at the same time, there are extra incentives for maximis-
 
1 The term ‘yo-yo’ club is used to describe clubs that go ‘down’ and ‘up’ divisions, that is, they 
are relegated and promoted, sometimes repeatedly. 
2 They take advantage of the ‘parachute’ payments, aimed to soften the financial blow of relega-
tion, which means that they share part of the revenues paid to the Premier League for their tele-
vision rights.  
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ing effort. Nevertheless, this system is also harmful. He mentions the rise in the 
cost of capital derived from the growing financial risk that clubs assume in their 
aim to win or avoid relegation. Finally, he points out that relegated clubs face 
the danger of being involved in a vicious circle. 
As we have explained, there is no evidence of whether performance on the 
pitch is the cause of revenue levels or if these revenues, along with structural 
funds, are themselves the origin of better performances. In any case, we can 
argue the existence of a relationship that might constitute a virtuous circle: good 
performance implies higher turnover and funds that may be invested on improv-
ing the sporting results. 
In accordance with the ideas just presented we aim to test whether or not in 
Spanish football, as in the English case, better performance on the pitch means 
higher revenues and whether good sports performance explains well the eco-
nomic results of clubs. 
So the structure of this paper begins by showing the features of the sample we 
have analysed (Section 2). Then in Section 3 we introduce the different meas-
urements of sports performance used by academics in previous studies. We 
design an appropriate variable that includes the effect of performance in all 
competitions. It also involves assigning a ranking indicator for performance in 
knock-out (cup) competitions. Then we explain the revenue variables that we 
have employed. So, in Section 4 we use a visual approach, as do Deloitte and 
Touche (2000 b). This allows us to test the sort of function most appropriate to 
revenues. We analyse the relationship between performance on the pitch and 
the different incomes of the club. The section ends with an analysis of the corre-
lation between revenues and expenses in order to understand the ability of 
clubs to obtain profits. The following step, in section 5, consists of testing the 
influence of sports performance on economic results. We do this by means of a 
descriptive statistical study and a regression analysis. Finally, we present our 
conclusions. 
2 THE SAMPLE 
The fact that the aim of this study links financial and sports performance vari-
ables leads us to deal with data from financial statements. Ideally, we would 
have liked to work with data from all Spanish professional football clubs, but it is 
impossible to find the financial information for every club. Despite the fact that 
Spanish companies must submit their annual financial report to a public regis-
ter, a high number of Spanish Sociedades Anónimas Deportivas (SADs)3 do not 
fulfil this requirement, at least on time. In the case of those clubs that are not 
companies, since they do not have this obligation, it is only possible to access 
their accounts if they supply them personally.  
                                            
3 In Spain, football clubs had to become (sporting) companies in early 1990s, although those 
which fulfilled certain economic requirements, such as having a positive net worth at that time, 
could remain as clubs. The sports companies in Spain are called Sociedades Anónimas Depor-
tivas (S.A.D.). 
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We requested the annual accounts of all clubs in the Spanish First and Second 
Division for the period under study (1998-2002). When the individual SAD did 
not provide us with the information requested, we sought it in the corresponding 
public register. We obtained those annual accounts that had been submitted to 
the register by September 2003. 
This is the reason why we eventually worked with a wide sample of clubs rather 
than the total number. We have analysed a sample of 134 valid cases for the 
statistic and econometric work. These cases correspond to 34 different clubs 
from the Spanish First and Second Division “A” during the period 1998-2002. 
Considering that each year a club’s features (the division in which it plays and 
its results) change, the sample consists of 84 First Division clubs and 50 from 
the Second Division “A”. So, each club is a different case for each year. We un-
derstand that, for the purpose of this study, that the sporting and financial be-
haviour of the club might change from season to season or, on the contrary, if a 
club has a clear policy that relates its economic results with the team perform-
ance then it would be consistent through time and the econometric analysis 
would detect this. 
3 THE MEASUREMENT OF SPORTS PERFORMANCE 
The measurement of sports performance depends on the competition under 
scrutiny and the perspective on which the study is focused. For example, if the 
object of analysis is the effect of performance on the pitch on attendance, it will 
be more useful to employ variables such as the ‘percentage of victories’ (Daw-
son et al., 2000; Marques, 2002; Boulier and Stekler,4 2003), ‘number of goals 
scored by match’ (Palacios-Huerta, 2002), ‘team’s goal average weighted by 
relative quality of rival team’ (Koning et al. 2001), ‘score/goal difference’ (Boulier 
and Stekler, 2003; Palacios-Huerta, 2002), and even variables which incorpo-
rate the ‘playing style’ (Cocco and Jones, 1997). Koning (2003) working on an 
evaluation of the effect of hiring coaches on team performance used ‘average 
goal difference,’ ‘goals conceded,’ and ‘goals scored.’ 
Studying forecast models, Goddard (2005) develops two approaches: goals-
based and results-based models. The variables he employs are ‘goals scored’, 
‘goals conceded’ and ‘results’ (with a ‘points score’ of 1 point for a win, 0.5 for a 
draw and 0 for a defeat). 
If the study focuses on open league competitions, the variables will be of ‘rank-
ing’ or ‘points obtained’ type. We are able to measure these variables in several 
ways. Some of them may be direct such as ‘points obtained in league’ (Gerrard, 
2001). Others will be formulated adjusting it with some kind of reference, for 
example, ‘points obtained in league over all possible points’ (Dawson et al., 
2000). For these types of measurements, we have decided to employ the 
‘points obtained in league’ variable, as Gerrard does, but accumulating the 
points obtained for the champion of the Second Division to those obtained by 
 
4 In this case it is applied to the NFL. 
each team in the First Division. This variable will be called accumulated points 
(ACPTS).   
When the tendencies over several seasons are analysed, average values are 
employed. They may be ‘position average value’ (Deloitte & Touche, 2000 a) or 
‘average of modified variables’ (Szymanski and Kuypers, 1999). 
‘Final league ranking’ may be used directly as a variable (Magaz, 2002). How-
ever, this measure is not very useful for our purposes as it presents an inverse 
relationship with most of the variables we are going to employ. The sign of the 
coefficient of the regression line will be negative due to an ordinary ranking as-
signing the least value to the team with the best performance. This is the reason 
why most of authors work with modified variables that we call ‘ranking meas-
ures’, µ(C1), where µ is a monotone decreasing function of ranking. Dobson and 
Goddard (2001) suggest: 
(1)   
n
p1n)C( l −+=µ  
Where n is the number of teams who take part in the competition and p is the 
position they achieved in the ranking. 
In this line, the formulation employed by Szymanski and Kuypers (1999) is: 
(2) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+−=µ p1n
plog)C( l  
As they work with 92 teams, the expression above becomes: 
(3) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−=µ p93
plog)C( l  
We are going to estimate the league ranking, as a measure of sports perform-
ance, following along the lines of Szymanski and Kuypers (1999) working with 
the following expression: 
(4) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−= p
pCl
43
log)(µ  
The difference with Szymanski and Kuypers’ formula lies in the number of clubs 
involved. Due to the fact that professional football in Spain consists of 20 clubs 
in the First Division and 22 Second Division “A” clubs, the total number of clubs 
involved in our study is 42. For this reason we take 43 (n+1) in the denominator. 
Finally, as far as ‘position’ is concerned, we take the end of the season ranking. 
First Division rankings range from 1 (the top club) to 20 (the bottom club). The 
top of the Second Division will rank as 21st position; the second one will be 
 7
place as 22nd, and so on, until the bottom of the Second Division, who will be 
graded 42nd. We call this league position variable LPOS.   
When we deal with other types of competitions, with a knock-out (cup) format, 
the measurement of the variable becomes complex. In fact, no author has pre-
viously suggested a measurement. Almost all the research papers work exclu-
sively with league results since that type of competition is more easily measur-
able and, being a stable and regular competition, it reflects the ability to achieve 
financial and sporting results in the long term. Besides, league position implies 
future expectations about participation in European competitions, promotion or 
relegation. 
Baimbridge (1997) carries out a study about the effects of a knock-out competi-
tion: the 1996 European Championship. Nevertheless, due to his focus on at-
tendance he does not develop a variable for measuring sports results. Koning et 
al. (2001) research a cup competition too in order to forecast results. However, 
they do not provide measures for the variables we are going to study. For this 
reason we have had to design a system for measuring performances in the 
Copa del Rey5, the UEFA Champions’ League and the UEFA Cup. 
Due to the fact that the cup competition system works neither on a ranking ba-
sis nor employs points, we have developed a method for expressing the posi-
tion of a particular team within cup competitions. We shall apply this ranking to 
the participation of clubs in the Copa del Rey, the UEFA Champions’ League, 
and the UEFA Cup. We shall only take into account the Intertoto Cup if the club 
qualifies for the UEFA Cup because it is a less important competition played in 
the summer, often with reserve team players. 
Figure 1. Diagram of measurement of result variable for cup-style competitions 
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5 The Spanish Cup organised by the Real Federación Española de Fútbol (the Spanish Football 
Association) 
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Figure 1 shows the assignation of position and point schema for cup-style com-
petitions. This model has been applied to the Copa del Rey and UEFA Cup 
competitions. We develop a ranking and assume that the champion would be 
placed first and the runner-up second. Below these two places, which are de-
cided in the final game of the competition, the teams who did not qualify in each 
round are at the same level. The two losing semi-finalists do not play each other 
in order to determine who comes third or fourth. Therefore, we have opted for 
ranking both failed semi-finalists as 4th. In previous rounds the same principle 
applies, and teams who have been knocked out of the competition in the same 
round will be awarded the same ranking. Hence we have ranked as 8th all the 
teams who lost in the quarter-finals. Accordingly, the 8 teams eliminated in the 
previous round are ranked 16th, the 16 teams knocked-out in the round prior to 
that are graded 32nd, and so on. 
The points are allocated taking into account the fact that the first rounds are 
played in one leg in the Copa del Rey. In this case, the team that qualifies nec-
essarily has had to win that match. Applying the league points system, we 
award 3 points to the winning teams in that round. This above framework does 
not work in European competition.6 However, we think that there is an argument 
to keep the points awarded the same in our system as the competitions have a 
limited number of matches. For this reason, we decided to keep the weighting of 
3 points for a win in order to mark the effects of progressing to the next round. 
From the round of 16 teams onwards, we award 6 points to the teams that go 
through to the following round. This would have applied anyway when a team 
had won both matches, but this might not necessarily happen. A particular team 
might qualify after drawing both legs (because of the ‘away goal counts double’ 
rule in cases of drawn aggregates), or after winning one and drawing the other 
match. In these cases, following the league point system, the team would have 
achieved 2 or 4 points respectively. However, as is illustrated in Figure 1, we 
have opted for allocating 6 points to the winning team in each round – even in 
the final – because we think that what matters is to establish the difference be-
tween the teams that progress in the competition and those that fare knocked 
out.  
In estimating the points for UEFA Champions’ League, we award no points to 
those teams that do not take part in the competition. Due to the lesser impor-
tance of the first stages of the competition - and in order to not penalise clubs 
who have qualified directly - we assign 1 point for each match won and 0.5 for 
drawn matches during the qualifying rounds. The points for the matches played 
during the group stage are in accordance with the UEFA criteria; that is, 3 
points for a victory and 1 for a draw. In order to weight the qualification to the 
next phase,7 we give 5 additional points for qualification for that stage. We 
award 1 additional point, added to the previous 5 (to make 6) for qualifying to 
 
6 Since the 2004/05 season, the structure of the UEFA Cup competition has changed including 
a mini-league group stage. Therefore, the system of allotting points might be similar to the 
UEFA Champions’ League.   
7 During the years of this study there were two group stages. Nowadays there is only one group 
stage and then the final knock-out phase. This implies that in order to apply this system some 
adjustment would be necessary to accommodate the changing competition structure. 
the second group stage, 7 for reaching the quarter-finals, 8 for the semi-finals 
and 9 for winning the final. Furthermore, we also allot 3 points for winning and 1 
for drawing during the final phase which is played as a knock-out competition. 
Those teams that are eliminated from the UEFA Champions’ League and join 
the UEFA Cup will get points from both competitions. 
In the League, we accumulate the points achieved by the First Division teams 
onto the number obtained by the Second Division Champions each year. We 
also use the points from other competitions according to the schema explained 
above. 
In order to measure the effect of all the important competitions combined, we 
have defined a compound index (IND) which consists of the points achieved in 
each competition. These are weighted according to the importance of the com-
petition for the overall valuation of the performance of the team. 
If Pi represents the points achieved in the i competition and αi represents the 
weight of each competition considered (the Copa del Rey, UEFA Cup, League, 
UEFA Champions’ League) then the compound index (IND) may be expressed 
as:  
∑
=
α= 4
1i
iiPIND  
We have chosen the weightings to develop the compound index by taking into 
account the relative importance that they have for the clubs from an economic 
viewpoint. So, the Copa del Rey is weighted as 1; UEFA Cup (and Cup Win-
ner’s Cup, when it existed) and the League are weighted as 2; and UEFA 
Champions’ League (UCL) as 3. We do not think that it is necessary to weight 
the League competition higher because every team plays a large number of 
matches and, consequently, the accumulated points will already have a bonus 
value, especially for First Division teams who accumulate the points of the Sec-
ond Division Champions. The expression of this index will be thus: 
(5) IND = Cup Pts. + 2•UEFA Pts. + 2•League Pts. + 3•UCL Pts. 
 
4 INFLUENCE OF SPORTS PERFORMANCE ON REVENUES 
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As we said at the beginning of the paper, there exists general agreement that 
good performance on the pitch will bring higher incomes (Szymanski and 
Kuypers, 1999; Deloitte & Touche 1999, 2000 b). These are not the only au-
thors who consider the club’s revenues as a function of sports performance – 
exclusively or considered alongside other factors. For example, El Hodiri and 
Quirk (1971) express the incomes of a sporting club as a function of the popula-
tion in which it is based and the sports performance is measured by a win ratio. 
Haan et al. (2002) explain the total turnover according to a club’s ticket sales – 
a consequence of income derived from the quantity of squad talent - and the 
money for winning linked to the likelihood of victory the club has. Finally, Hoehn 
and Szymanski (1999), within the context of an analysis of competitive balance, 
determine a club’s revenues, along with other factors, from the percentage of 
victories each team gets. 
Taking this theoretical background as reference, we are going to test if a better 
sports performance is a source of higher revenues for Spanish clubs. We 
seek the verification of this hypothesis by mean of a simple univariate regres-
sion analysis. Previously, we have observed that the relationship between in-
come and performance on the pitch has an exponential character. As a conse-
quence of this, the highest-ranked teams usually have much higher turnover 
than the lowest-ranked ones. Besides, the difference in incomes among the 
lowest-ranked teams is much less significant. Hence, we decided to work with 
the logarithm of income variables.  
Figure 2. Budget, number of members and league ranking (Season 2001/2002) 
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In order to corroborate what we have just asserted above, we have followed the 
visual model employed by Deloitte and Touche (2000) and we have performed 
a similar analysis with all the Spanish clubs8 during the 2001/2002 season. The 
results are shown in Figure 2. In this case, the budget9 (in millions of euros) is 
represented on the y-axis, while the ranking in the League for that season ap-
pears on the x-axis. The width of the bubble represents each club’s number of 
members. Figure 2 also includes the line that adjusts the exponential regression 
between budget and ranking in league. The level of explanation of that regres-
sion is 55.12%. It would be better if teams as Atlético de Madrid, Racing de 
                                            
8 We have had to exclude Real Madrid from the sample since its budget for that season was 
extraordinarily inflated as consequence of the sale of the land of its training grounds sited in the 
city. 
 11
9 Budget is defined from expected total income. In this sense our approach is similar tthat of 
Deloitte and Touche. 
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Santander and Oviedo (with budget more suitable to First Division) were in the 
top flight of Spanish football in that season.  
It is worth explaining the income variables with which are going to work. We 
must remember that these variables are conditioned by the information that 
clubs report in their annual accounts.  
We are going to work with the variables ‘sporting revenues’ (SR) and ‘season 
tickets’ (ST), which incorporates revenues from season tickets, membership 
and executive boxes. The sporting revenues variable (SR) represents 77.2% of 
the net ordinary income of Spanish football clubs and the season ticket reve-
nues (ST) represent the remaining 22.8%. 
The variable ‘sporting revenues’ (SR) gathers information from other incomes. It 
consists of information from different constituents, namely, the income from 
match tickets and the pools (combined as the TAP variable), television rights 
(TV) and advertising/sponsorship (ADV). The sporting revenues variable can, 
then, be called a ‘summarising variable’. However, it is not unusual for this 
‘summarising variable’ to have a higher value than the sum of its constituent 
variables. The reason for this might be that some clubs provide an abbreviated 
form of their accounts and only report the summarising variables. So, not all 
clubs provide full information about each constituent of every variable. This will 
affect the number of valid cases for each variable.  
The Spanish rules of accountancy state that clubs have to register as ‘Sporting 
Revenues’ the incomes from their main activity, which is the participation in 
sporting competitions. These rules stipulate that the SR account include in-
comes such as commercials, broadcasting rights, advertising, sponsorship and 
pools share. 
The variable ‘Tickets and Pools’ (TAP) represents the incomes from sporting 
competitions and from the pools. Apart from the income from ticket sales, in 
some cases, clubs might register in this account prizes for taking part in compe-
titions, and similar funds. The revenues from sporting competitions represent 
15.7% of sports revenues of the sample. The ‘pools’ account is the appropriate 
one for registering the share that a particular club receives in pools money. It 
would be interesting to consider both tickets and pools accounts separately, but 
the level of valid cases for the ‘pools’ variable is low (44.1%). The reason is that 
many clubs combine the information for tickets and pools within a single ac-
count. Hence, we have decided to work with a variable that is the sum of both 
accounts (TAP). This variable represents 16.3% of sporting revenues. 
The variable ‘TV rights’ (TV) subsumes, in general, all the revenues linked to 
the cession of broadcasting, internet and other rights. This variable has to be 
considered for its relevance within the conceptual schema of the football busi-
ness as well as for its importance as a revenue stream (TV revenues constitute 
46.7% of sporting revenues). Sevilla CF, for two seasons, combined its informa-
tion on incomes from television rights and advertising. In our sample, we have 
included both elements within the TV variable. 
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The last variable that forms part of sporting revenues is ‘advertising’ (ADV). This 
variable represents 20% of the total amount of sporting revenues. Although the 
name of the variable is advertising, it includes sponsorship as well. 
Incomes from the main activity, but related to membership fees, membership 
cards, season tickets, and so on, are accounted as ‘season tickets’ (ST). As 
was mentioned earlier, this variable shows an important weighting in the net 
ordinary income (22.8%). 
Now that the variables have been explained, we can present the results 
achieved from the regression analysis. We have had to exclude Real Betis from 
the sample due to the fact that it has handed over all its exploitation rights to a 
service company and hence it does not enter any amount in the income ac-
counts that are analysed here.  
Due to the exponential character of the functions of revenues explained above, 
we have worked with their logarithm. For this reason, we have expressed the 
variables with the prefix ‘L’. 
Table 1. Statistics of regression between sports performance and revenues. 
LSR R2 t sig.   LADV R2 t sig.  
LPOS 0,722 18,143 0,000  LPOS 0,587 11,735 0,000 
ACPTS 0,775 20,940 0,000  ACPTS 0,513 10,105 0,000 
IND 0,885 29,371 0,000  IND 0,669 13,644 0,000 
      
LTAP R2 t sig.   LST R2 t sig.  
LPOS 0,592 12,102 0,000  LPOS 0,599 12,872 0,000 
ACPTS 0,496 9,968 0,000  ACPTS 0,538 11,363 0,000 
IND 0,739 16,413 0,000  IND 0,668 14,128 0,000 
       
LTV R2 t sig.       
LPOS 0,612 12,497 0,000      
ACPTS 0,731 16,412 0,000      
IND 0,745 16,400 0,000      
Note: dependent variables are shown in bold italics 
Table 1 shows the results that we have reached. Based on this information we 
can state that, in general, the different measures for the sports performance 
variable explain to a high percentage and in a statistically significant way the 
main revenue streams of Spanish professional football clubs. It appears that 
sports performance does indeed affect the main revenues of a football club in 
Spain. These outcomes agree with those reached by Szymanski and Kuypers 
(1999), particularly referring to sporting revenues. Besides, the behaviour of the 
compound index (IND) is especially good for explaining revenues of clubs.  
The variable that best explains the performance on the pitch (independent of 
the measure used) is the sporting revenues (SR), as might be expected. Also 
the revenues from television rights (TV) explain sports results strongly. 
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Finally, as we pointed out in the introduction, the main aim of our work is to 
check whether or not sports performance influences economic results. Since 
the bottom line is a consequence of the subtraction of expenses from turnover, 
in addition to the study of the relationship between sports performance and 
revenues, an analysis of the sports performance on expenses (or a similar 
study) would be appropriate. We have opted to test the existence of a correla-
tion between revenues and expenses. If a relationship exists, then the regres-
sion analysis would give an outcome of analogous results such as that which 
we obtained previously. A very high correlation exists between revenues and 
costs. It is significant at a 0.01 level (2-tailed) and the value of the correlation 
between sporting revenues and staffing costs for the sample under considera-
tion is 93.2%. This means that the main expenses account is going to have 
practically the same patterns of behaviour as the core account of ordinary in-
come. Bearing in mind that staffing costs represent approximately 70% of total 
incomes of Spanish football clubs, it is logic to conclude that profits will not be 
high. In this case, it means that sports performance will have little explanation 
power over economic results. This issue is will be analysed further in the follow-
ing section. 
5 INFLUENCE OF SPORTS PERFORMANCE ON ECONOMIC RESULTS 
Now, we will provide empirical evidence to support (or reject) the theories out-
lined at the start of this paper. Independent of what the core football business 
concept might be, of whether or not football clubs are profit-maximisers, each of 
the following proposals implies that there is no relationship between sports per-
formance and economic results: 1) balance between sports performance and 
profit of the club in the long term (Szymanski and Kuypers, 1999); 2) seeking 
the best possible sports performance while maintaining financial solvency (Mor-
row, 1999); 3) looking to maximise sports performance once the minimum profit 
levels have been achieved (Gerrard and Dobson, 2000); 4) considering null 
profit as the aim: or 5) that once the economic target has been satisfied, any the 
excess resources will be spent on improving the squad (Guijarro et al., 2000).  
The hypothesis that is tested here is the following: even when clubs achieve 
good sporting performances, this does not condition their economic re-
sults, or if it does, it does so only weakly. 
Prior to the econometric analysis, a statistical study was carried out of profit be-
fore and after taxes, total turnover of ordinary activities and extraordinary re-
sults. With this analysis we try to find out if, on average, the economic results of 
Spanish football clubs tend to be close to zero; also if the average profit repre-
sents an high percentage of revenues; and, finally, to show the relevance of 
extraordinary results in the Spanish clubs’ profit an loss account. 
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Table 2. Statistics on revenues and economic results (1st & 2nd Divisions, 1998-2002) 
(data in euros) Mean Median Std. Deviat. Range 
Net Profit 375,963 116,632 7,090,508 74,326,842 
Profit before taxes 713,386 144,937 7,862,456 74,326,842 
Total Ordinary Revenue  24,355,909 14,853,016 31,503,993 162,241,342 
Extraordinary Results 12,441,800 5,674,272 32,636,209 340,094,785 
 
 
Table 3. Statistics on revenues and economic results (1st Division, 1998-2002) 
(data in euros) Mean Median Std, Deviat, Range 
Net Profit 1,900,872 271,123 7,795,448 68,874,178
Profit before taxes 2,427,858 434,216 8,759,167 68,874,178
Total Ordinary Revenue  35,447,344 21,514,165 35,285,960 155,501,863
Extraordinary Results 18,097,299 9,206,201 40,134,718 340,094,785
 
 
Table 4. Statistics on revenues and economic results (2nd Division, 1998-2002) 
(data in euros) Mean Median Std, Deviat, Range 
Net Profit -2,185,883 -628,130 4,779,430 29,296,696
Profit before taxes -2,166,927 -571,190 4,932,384 29,460,736
Total Ordinary Revenue  5,722,298 4,229,989 4,438,351 22,102,473
Extraordinary Results 2,940,562 1,363,823 3,950,782 19,006,563
 
We find that the average net profit of Spanish football clubs during the period of 
study is slightly positive but with a more robust estimator, as the median is, this 
result decreases remarkably. There is a wide range among the economic re-
sults obtained for clubs over the period of study and a high standard deviation. 
This would mean that extreme values would influence the average. 
Another point worth highlighting is the small proportion that expected profit 
represents with respect to the total ordinary revenue and the extraordinary re-
sults. This implies a high volume of expenses. 
The results, dividing the sample according the division in which the club be-
longed in each season, illustrate that in First Division on average the clubs 
make a profit, while in Second Division they lose money. In addition, in this 
case, it is notable that the amount of average losses is more than a third (in ab-
solute terms) of the total ordinary revenue. 
Nevertheless these data are not enough when we try to test that, in general 
terms, the profit of Spanish football clubs tends to be null. For this reason a fre-
quency analysis was carried out in order to find out the distribution function of 
the economic results of the sample. Figure 3 shows us a clear concentration of 
profits and losses around zero. The fact is that 91.8% of the clubs in the sample 
make a profit of less than 10 million euros and greater than -10 million euros. 
Besides, 31.1% of the clubs have profit of less than 500,000 euros.  
 
Figure 3. Net Profit distribution function 
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In a second stage, we have carried out a univariate ordinary least squared 
(OLS) regression analysis in order to verify the hypothesis proposed at the start 
of this section. The dependent variable we have employed is the Net Profit of 
football clubs and SADs. The independent variable is performance on the pitch. 
We have used the measurement of sports performance outlined earlier, that is, 
a measure of ranking (LPOS, according to expression (4)), of accumulated 
points obtained (ACPTS), and the compound index (IND estimated as indicated 
in (5)). 
Table 5. Statistics of regression between sports performance and economic results. 
Independent variables R2 t Sig, 
LPOS 0,080 3,387 ,001 
ACPTS 0,090 3,621 ,000 
IND 0,141 4,255 ,000 
Dependent variable: NP (Net Profit) 
 
The outcome of the regression shows us that the independent variables ex-
plaining power is considerably low. The compound index (IND) explains only 
14% of the net profit of Spanish football clubs. The other two variables demon-
strate an even poorer explanation power, as they do not even explain 10% of 
the dependent variable. Consequently, other causes not included in the model 
have a higher explaining power than sports performance. So, we may suppose 
that the sports performance has little conditioning effect on economic results of 
football clubs and SADs. 
 16
 17
We have also checked the relationship analysed in Table 5 considering only 
data from season 1999-2000. The idea was to test if a higher explanation power 
would be found in a shorter term. However, the results obtained are even worse 
(R2 of 0.018; 0.001 and 0.089 for LPOS, ACPTS and IND respectively). 
We may find an explanation for this outcome in Table 2. As has already been 
pointed out, it can be observed that the mean of clubs’ net profit is very low, 
especially if we compare it with the mean of revenues. The average net profit 
only represents 1.5% of the mean of the total ordinary revenues. Taking a most 
robust estimator as median, the percentage falls to 0.8%. These facts support 
the hypothesis that the Spanish clubs tend to null profit. However, at the same 
time, we have to be prudent when we interpret these figures because of the 
high dispersion in the data that we have found. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
We have found that there is a non-linear relationship, with an explanation de-
gree of 55.12%, between budget (expected income) of Spanish football clubs 
and sports performance. This outcome is consistent with the findings of Deloitte 
and Touche (2000). 
Independent of the measurement to reflect sports performance, it explains in a 
high and statistically significant way the main sources of revenues of Spanish 
football clubs. Due to the characteristics of the sample and the way that the 
clubs report their financial statements, the ‘sporting revenues’ is the best vari-
able to explain performance on the pitch. These results concur with those ob-
tained by Szymanski and Kuypers (1999) for English football. 
The compound index (IND), which reflects the performance of the team in the 
main competitions, shows the highest degree of explanation of the different 
revenues streams of Spanish football clubs. We think that the most relevant 
point here is the fact that we did not limit our data to results of league competi-
tions. We are aware that the system designed by us is open to discussion, but 
what is clear is that it is worth working with measures of performance that in-
clude all the competitions in which the club is involved. 
We have proven the existence of a very high, significant correlation between 
‘sporting revenues’ and the main expenses account, that is, staffing costs. Tak-
ing into account that staffing costs represent more than 70% of total incomes in 
Spanish football clubs, it is not surprising that we found that the average net 
profit of Spanish football clubs in the period 1998-2002 to be only slightly posi-
tive. If we split the sample between First and Second Divisions, the result is that 
the average First Division clubs shows a profit while the average Second Divi-
sion club shows a loss. Even in the case of First Division clubs, the average net 
profit obtained represents an undersized proportion of total ordinary revenue. 
Furthermore, after a study of frequencies, we found an important concentration 
of cases in the sample with a net profit around zero. 
Finally, the results of the regression analysis between sports performances and 
economic results during the period 1998-2002 show us that sports performance 
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has almost no explanation power of economic results. Following the approach 
of Szmanski and Kuypers (1999), and trying to verify whether or not in the short 
term a higher relationship could exist, we have tested the dependence between 
both variables in the 1999-2000 season, and the results are even worse. So we 
have to conclude that in Spanish football there must be other causes not-
included in the model (economic results = f[sports performance]) with a higher 
power to explain economic results than performance on the pitch. 
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